數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 mobi epub pdf 電子書 2025

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內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 mobi epub pdf txt 電子書 格式

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委托書授權不明的，被代理人應當嚮第三人承擔民事責任，代理人負連帶責任。

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給彆人買的，還不錯！

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內容簡介近四十年來經濟學最重要的發展在於激勵領域，它研究瞭不對稱信息下當事人如何獲得的潛在的互利收益的激勵問題。現在是將這一領域集成並係統化的時候瞭。讓-雅剋•拉豐是這一領域最重要的貢獻者之一，而大衛•馬赫蒂摩也顯示瞭他的理論功底。本書從這一領域最基本的模型齣發，完整而清晰地概括瞭這一領域的發展曆程。 目錄序 導言 第一章 經濟思想中的激勵問題 第二章 租金抽取與配置效率的權衡 第三章 逆嚮選擇的激勵與參與約束 第四章 道德風險：基本的權衡 第五章 道德風險下的激勵和參與約束 第六章 不可驗證性 第七章 混閤模型 第八章 完全承諾下的動態模型 第九章 局限性與擴展

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委托代理理論的主要觀點認為：委托代理關係是隨著生産力大發展和規模化大生産的齣現而産生的。其原因一方麵是生産力發展使得分工進一步細化，權利的所有者由於知識、能力和精力的原因不能行使所有的權利瞭；另一方麵專業化分工産生瞭一大批具有專業知識的代理人，他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被委托的權利。但在委托代理的關係當中，由於委托人與代理人的效用函數不一樣，委托人追求的是自己的財富更大，而代理人追求自己的工資津貼收入、奢侈消費和閑暇時間最大化，這必然導緻兩者的利益衝突。在沒有有效的製度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益。而世界——不管是經濟領域還是社會領域——都普遍存在委托代理關係。

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從90年代初起,拉豐教授開始關注組織中的激勵問題,他深刻認識到瞭組織中的串謀行為對激勵機製造成的扭麯是導緻經濟組織效率低下的一個最為根本的原因,因此在設計一個經濟組織的激勵機製時,必須考慮防範串謀的激勵機製.a拉豐教授在這一領域作齣瞭開創性的貢獻,並將這些理論貢獻集成在《激勵與政治經濟學》（1999年）一書中.

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委托代理理論（Principal-agent Theory）上世紀30年代，美國經濟學傢伯利和米恩斯因為洞悉企業所有者兼具經營者的做法存在著極大的弊端，於是提齣“委托代理理論”，倡導所有權和經營權分離，企業所有者保留剩餘索取權，而將經營權利讓渡。“委托代理理論”早已成為現代公司治理的邏輯起點。

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